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On 12 June 1776, the General Convention of delegates and representatives from the several counties and corporations of Virginia adopted what has come to be known as the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 9 It was a revolutionary document, which sometimes, though incorrectly, is also called the Virginia Bill of Rights, in an unconscious or perhaps deliberate allusion to the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The reference to the English "Act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the crown", as its proper title runs, is misleading as it was issued by "the said Lords Spirituall and Temporall and
Commons […] for the Vindicating and Asserting their auntient Rights and Liberties". 10 In strictly political terms it marked the end of the Glorious Revolution and became part of the Revolution settlement. 11 It did not refer to universal principles or any abstract idea; rather, considering the endeavor of the late King "to subvert and extirpate the Protestant Religion, and the Lawes and Liberties of this Kingdome", the Lords and Commons took recourse to what they understood to be "their undoubted Rights and Liberties".
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The Virginia delegates of 1776 easily could have made use of a similar kind of language, as numerous Americans had done during the preceding decade. But they deliberately introduced new language: "A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government." 13 This was a completely new kind 9 The most detailed account on the Virginia Declaration of Rights and its history is by A. E. Dick
Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, 2 vols., Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974, I, 27-313 . For a historical perspective on the convention work, cf. John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775 -1783 , Williamsburg, Va.: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988 of document employing a new, bold language. It was a "declaration of rights", not a subjective document declaring rights, and it was set up by "the representatives of the […] people", who were "assembled in full and free convention", not in any random assembly with an equivocal legitimization. 14 Furthermore they had declared rights properly belonging to the people and their offspring, not to their own assembly or convention in contrast to some other institution. These rights served, in the most revolutionary phrase of all, "as the basis and foundation of government", an assertion completely unheard of and contradictory to any understanding of the English constitution.
This bold revolutionary language was substantiated in the first two sections of the document, which uncovered the source of all these rights ascertained: nature. Natural law not only conferred to the people "certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity". It also proved "[t]hat all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people". for the first time styled itself "constitution", no appeal occurred in either of them to the sovereignty of the people, universal principles, inherent human rights, or a written constitution as "the basis and foundation of government". As the first written constitutions their form was new, but their content had not yet shed its traditional connotations.
All this changed with the Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 1776. It not only enumerated several of these rights. It also proclaimed additional criteria, ever since then considered constitutive for modern constitutionalism. These are the responsibility and accountability of government, the right "to reform, alter, or abolish it", the separation of powers, the "trial by an impartial jury", and the inherent idea that constitutional government is by its very nature a limited government. 18 It was a mixture of fundamental principles and structural elements to be contained in a subsequent constitution, both considered indispensable preconditions for securing individual liberty and guaranteeing rational government according to law, instead of government according to pleasure, privilege, or corruption. None of these criteria were really new. In fact, they all had been extensively discussed throughout the colonies during the preceding decade. But never before had they appeared in a public document in such a coherent form, constituting the foundation of a new political order. 
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all power was derived from the nation. 42 There was no declaration of rights and of universal principles, but in substance Title II "Of Belgians and their rights" served the very purpose.
Government accountability was not proclaimed, but art. 24 ruled how public officers were to be made responsible for administrative acts. 43 The constitution was entrenched, but no provision was made to prevent the respective article from being abrogated. 44 The political privileges of the aristocracy were abolished, but in order to be elected senator a high property qualification was necessary. 45 Thus representative government was assured, along with a separation of powers, limited government, independence of the judiciary, and finally the amending power. opponents and the severe setbacks resulting from the reaction of the 1850s had firmly taken root in Europe, even if its further history in this part of the world would prove to be full of contradictions. A major step to put government on a more rational foundation for the benefit of the people had been achieved.
Easy victory was procured in these days in a completely different place, where future contradictions were to be no less evident: Liberia. Its constitution of 26 July 1847, American as its provenance was, transplanted all ten Virginia essentials to the west coast of Africa. 61 In
Latin America, however, a formal structure of government according to the example set by the United States was filled with contents originating from the Spanish, Portuguese or French colonial past, the social discrepancies of a ruling elite facing the indigenous masses deprived of their rights, and some recent European influences. This particular setting caused and continues to cause a manifestly different understanding of constitution resulting in a gulf between the formal constitution and the material constitution, which only seems to have been narrowing in recent years. 62 The constitutions of the first half of the 19 th century willingly acknowledged representative government and separation of powers. Some elevated the constitution to paramount law and contained elaborate provisions for an amending process.
Limited government, accountability, and an independent judiciary, however, were generally not favorite topics nor did they assume real meaning. Quite often human rights were declared, though many constitutions had reserved them only for the "ciudadinos", which appears to be just another word for the ruling elite, whereas the "duties", which hardly any constitution forgot to list, seem to have primarily applied to the rest of the population. This may also explain why universal principles were so rare in these constitutions and most of them preferred to refer to the sovereignty of the nation, instead of the more radical sovereignty of 60 the people. In spite of these sweeping impressions, substantial differences between the constitutions of e.g. Ecuador and Guatemala existed and different political situations or social contexts may have resulted in opening the countries more for the essentials of modern constitutionalism. Therefore, a much more detailed analysis of the hundreds of Latin American constitutions from Mexico to Argentina, their political origins, and the intellectual discourse in which they were embedded will be needed, for which I lack space and, even more so, competence.
The history of modern constitutionalism is a history still in need of writing. 
